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Abstract
Privacy Preserving Data Publishing addresses the problem of publishing the data collected from data owners by the data holder
or publisher such that personal sensitive information of the individual is preserved and the published data is highly useful. The
anonymization techniques such as Generalization, Suppression, Swapping, Bucketization and Randomization suffers from either
individual identity disclosure or the significant loss in information which reduces the usefulness of the data. In this paper, we
present a novel Privacy Preserving Data Publishing scheme based on tuple duplication. We introduce the notion of Semantically
Equivalent Attribute Values for sensitive attributes and Reputation Loss by Disclosure to hide the sensitive information of an
individual in the published data. The Trapdoor Attribute Values for sensitive attributes are defined which helps in recovering the
original dataset from the published dataset. We evaluate the proposed scheme with the existing attack models and show that our
scheme counters those attacks. We define our own privacy criterion and show that the published data achieves the same. We assess
the utility of the published data by using the existing utility metrics and our own defined utility metric. We show that the utility of
the published data using the proposed sanitization mechanism is high.
c⃝ 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Department of Computer Science &
Engineering, National Institute of Technology Rourkela.
Keywords: PPDP; Trapdoor Attribute Values; Reputation Loss; Semantically equivalent Attribute Values; Utility.
1. Introduction
Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) provides methods and tools for publishing useful information while
preserving data privacy (Chen, Kifer, LeFevre & Machanavajjhala 2009). PPDP is required as there can be serious
consequences if the owner (or publisher) of the data publishes the data without taking care about the protection of
the sensitive information. There are several instances that demonstrates the problem. (Sweeney 2002) identified the
insufficient privacy protection of a medical dataset. About 87 percent of the individuals were uniquely identified
in real medical data by matching several attributes with publicly available voter registration list by simple mapping
operation. AOL published the search/query logs in 2006 and later withdrawn as New York Times reports were able to
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identify a 62 year old woman living in Lilburn (Georgia) by using her various individual specific queries (Barbaro &
Zeller 2006). Disclosure of individual’s disease will have severe social consequences. Disclosure of the individual’s
salary information causes concern to individual’s security.
One straight forward solution to protect the individual’s sensitive information is not to disclose the information
itself. This hinders the very purpose of the data utility involving data mining applications. The approaches of setting
guidelines and policies to restrict the type of publishable data and the agreements signed on the usage and storage of
sensitive data, either suffers from excessive data distortion or demands impractically high trust levels. Adversary who
does not follow the rules at place is not prevented by the policies and guidelines. So, there is need of efficient PPDP
schemes which provide the technical solution to the privacy protection so that it is hard for an adversary with sufficient
background knowledge to infer the sensitive/private information about an individual from the published/released data.
The difference between Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) and PPDP can be found in (Fung 2007).
1.1. Overview of Data Collection and Publishing Scenario
Privacy Preserving Data Publishing scenario includes following parties.
∙ Data User or Data recipient: The user who wants to utilize the data. This party conducts data mining operations
on the published data. For example, researchers, data analysts etc.
∙ Adversary: Adversary is the third party who wants to derive private information about individuals from the re-
leased/published data. Adversary tries to get the sensitive information from the published data and the background
knowledge he possesses.
∙ Data Publisher or Data Collector: A party who collects the data and wants to release the data in a way that is
useful, satisfies the needs of the data users and adversary cannot infer the private information about the individuals.
∙ Individuals or Record owners: These are the parties who submit the data to the data publisher. These individuals
may trust the data publisher and give all the information requested by the data publisher. If the individuals wont
trust the data publisher and wont agree the privacy policy of the data publisher, then they might not give all the
requested information and hence, they make sure that the data publisher would not be able to get the sensitive
information when they submit the data to data publisher.
1.1.1. Utility vs Privacy
In order to generate the data without sensitive information the data owner or data publisher modifies the data. The
usefulness of the data is distorted by modification. There is a tradeoff between the privacy and utility. There are
two extreme possibilities that a data publisher can do to release the data. Data publisher may release nothing so that
privacy is perfectly preserved. In this case, no data user will be able to use the data. So, utility is zero. On the
other end, data publisher may release the data without modification so that the utility is maximized but the privacy is
completely lost. The following three components needs defined for any PPDP scheme (Wong & Fu 2010).
1. Sanitization Mechanism: Given original dataset a sanitization mechanism sanitizes the dataset by making the
data less precise. The dataset after sanitization process is called released candidate.
2. Privacy Criterion: The privacy criterion defines whether the release candidate is safe for release or not.
3. Utility Metric: Given a released candidate, the utility metric quantifies the utility of the release candidate.
The PPDP scheme should release the most useful candidate that satisfies the defined privacy criterion.
1.2. Related Work
Privacy preserving data publishing of microdata is the research focus in the recent years. Microdata contains
records each of which contains information about an individual entity, such as a person or an organization. There
are various sanitization mechanisms that addresses the issue of privacy preserving while publishing the data. The
common anonymization techniques are Generalization (Samarati 2001) for k− anonymity (Sweeney 2002), Suppres-
sion, Swapping , Bucketization (Martin, Kifer, Machanavajjhala, Gehrke & Halpern 2007) (Xiao & Tao 2006) and
Randomization (Chen et al. 2009) (Zhang, Koudas, Srivastava & Yu 2007).
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Generalization technique used for preserving privacy while publishing data loses considerable amount of informa-
tion. Bucketization does not prevent membership disclosure. Moreover, Bucketization mechanism cannot be applied
to the data which does not have clear separation between the quasi-identifying attributes and sensitive attributes. Sup-
pose in swapping method if the sensitive attribute values are swapped, an individual record owner cannot identify
whether his/her data is correctly published or not. Suppression and Randomization techniques suffer from loss of
information. (Fung, Wang, Chen & Yu 2010) detailed a survey on the recent developments. (Dwork, Mcsherry,
Nissim & Smith 2006) proposed a method to calibrate noise and analyzing the data. The anonymization technique
k-anonymity (Sweeney 2002) anonymizes the data such that there will be information loss due to the method used
to achieve the k-anonymity. In k-anonymity, only Quasi Identifiers of k tuples are made similar and the sensitive
attributes are retained as in the original table. (Aggarwal 2005) proves that, when the number of attributes in quasi
identifiers is high, enforcing k-anonymity necessarily results in severe information loss, even for small k. In our
proposed method, we wont sanitize (alter) the original data as in k-anonymity and hence, the usefulness of the data is
preserved. The queries that are run on the original data can also be run on the released data to get the same query
response. So the released data remains highly useful as we show in later sections. Raymond et.al (Wong, Fu, Wang &
Pei 2007) introduced minimality attack and claimed that all known mechanisms try to minimize information loss and
such an attempt provides a loophole for attacks. We attempt to solve the minimality attack in our proposed scheme.
As in other methods mentioned above, we wont modify the original data values.
1.3. Our Contribution
We design a novel technique for Privacy Preserving Data Publishing. The proposed technique preserves the indi-
vidual privacy and the data published using the proposed sanitization mechanism represents high utility.
We introduce the notions of Semantically Secure Attribute Values and the Reputation Loss by Disclosure to hide
the sensitive information of an individual/record owner in the published data. We introduce the concept of Trapdoor
Attribute Values for sensitive attributes which are kept secret by the data publisher and later used by him/her to recover
the original data.
We analyze the scheme with the existing attack models and show that how the released data withstands those
attacks. We analyze the scheme for the preserving privacy using the existing privacy models and define our own
privacy criterion and show that it meets the same. We show that the released data has higher utility using the existing
utility metrics and our own defined metric.
2. Notations and Definitions
Definition 2.1 (Original Dataset, T) The original dataset is a relational table T (A1,A2, . . . ,An) with n attributes,
A= {A1,A2, . . . ,An}. D[Ai] ,1≤ i≤ n, is the attribute domain of the corresponding attribute Ai. Represent each tuple
t ∈ T as t = (t[A1], t[A2], . . . , t[An]), where t[Ai], for 1≤ i≤ n is the value of the attribute Ai in tuple t of table T . T is
the dataset to be published.
We use ∣T ∣ to denote number of tuples/rows in table T . ∣T ∣ is the one data publisher wants to publish. Each row
corresponds to a record owner/individual. The set of attributes {A1,A2, . . . ,An} in T are categorized into Explicit
Identifiers, Quasi Identifiers and Sensitive Attributes . We define each of these categories.
Definition 2.2 (Explicit Identifiers, EI) A set EI ⊂ A is a set of attributes that uniquely and explicitly identify an
individual or record owner in T . For instance, Name and Social Security Number (SSN) are the attributes that
uniquely identify an individual.
Definition 2.3 (Sensitive Attributes, SA) It is the set of attributes SA⊂ A containing personal sensitive information.
For instance, salary, disease are the sensitive information specific to an individual. These attributes are not known to
adversary.
Definition 2.4 (Quasi Identifiers, QID) It is the set of attributes QID⊂ A which taken together can potentially iden-
tify an individual. For instance, Birthday, sex and Zipcode together can be used to potentially identify an individual.
An adversary might already know this information.
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Definition 2.5 (Release Candidate Data Set, T’) Let T (A1,A2, . . . ,An) be the original dataset held by the data pub-
lisher. Let S be the sanitization method applied to T . Let T
′
(Ai1 ,Ai2 , . . . ,Aik ) such that k < n be the output as a result
of running S on T . We call T
′
the candidate dataset that a data publisher would release for public use.
We denoteCAi to be the set of values of attribute Ai in T . It should be noted thatCAi ⊂ D[Ai].
Definition 2.6 (Trapdoor Sensitive Attribute Values, TSV) Let Ai ∈ SA. Let D[Ai] be the domain of Ai. Given T ,
let CAi be the set of all values in the column corresponding to the attribute Ai. Then, we define Trapdoor Sensitive
Attribute Values corresponding to Ai as a set of values TSV (Ai)⊂ D[Ai]−CAi .
Definition 2.7 (Semantically Equivalent Domain Values) Let Ai ∈ SA (the definition also holds good for Ai ∈ A in
general). Let D[Ai] = {a1,a2, . . . ,at}. Let each of the domain values are associated with set of features which contains
information to define the semantics of the attribute value. Let ai,a j ∈D[Ai]. Let F(ai) = { f 1i , f 2i , . . . , f pi } be the set of
features that defines the semantics of ai. Likewise, F(a j) = { f 1j , f 2j , . . . , f qj }. Let k be some threshold and p,q> k. We
say that, ai and a j are semantically equivalent (denote it as ai
s⇔ a j) , ai s⇔ a j i f ∣F(a j)∩F(a j)∣ ≥ k.
Definition 2.8 (Reputation Loss by Disclosure) Reputation Loss by Disclosure is defined to be a term which tells
the impact on the reputation of an individual by disclosing a sensitive information. Intuitively, we denote reputation
loss for an individual as, RLosst(a), where t ∈ T is the tuple corresponding to an individual under consideration and
a is the sensitive attribute value.
Definition 2.9 [Adversarial Background Knowledge, α] Let T
′
be the released candidate. Let QID
′
be the set of
Quasi Identifiers in T
′
such that QID
′ ⊂ QID, where QID corresponds to the set of Quasi Identifiers in Original
Data Set T . For a given tuple t ∈ T ′ , we define the adversarial background knowledge α to be the set of values
corresponding to the attributes in QID of t along with some external information ζ which could possibly involve
QID
′ ⊆ QID with Identity of an individual. Let QID′ = Ai1 ,Ai2 , . . . ,Aik . We denote background knowledge by α =
{t[Ai1 ], t[Ai2 , . . . , t[Aik ]]∪ζ .
Definition 2.10 [Queries with Sensitive Attribute Values in Where Clause, Qs] Let T
′
be the released candidate
(We assume there is only one Sensitive Attribute). Let {a1,a2, . . . ,ak} be the set of sensitive attribute values and
{b1,b2, . . . ,bk} are the Trapdoor Sensitive Attribute Values. Qs is the set of all queries with Where Clause taking
values from {a1,a2, . . . ,ak}.
Our Assumptions: We make the following assumptions.
∙ We assume that EI∩QID∩SA= /0.
∙ We assume that data owner has only one sensitive value corresponding to the sensitive attribute in T and an adver-
sary has the background knowledge as defined in Definition 2.9. We assume there is a single data publisher and the
data publisher is trusted. We give an idea how to deal with untrusted data publisher.
3. Details of Proposed scheme
In this section, we detail our proposed PPDP scheme. Let T (A1, . . . ,An) be the original dataset held by the data
publisher, which is a relational table with m rows and n attributes. Each row corresponds to an individual/record
owner. Let EI = {A1, . . . ,Au} be the set of Explicit Identifiers, QID= {Au+1, . . . ,Av} be the set of Quasi Identifiers
and SA= {Av+1, . . . ,An} be the set of Sensitive Attributes.
First, we remove all the columns corresponding to the set of EI. Let this new table after elimination be T
′
. Consider
the sensitive attribute values corresponding the set SA in each tuple of T
′
. Pick for each tuple and for each of the
sensitive attribute values a semantically equivalent attribute value from the domain of the sensitive attribute except in
the set of attribute values corresponding to the sensitive attribute in T
′
. The Reputation Loss of the chosen attribute
should be less than the sensitive attribute value. Add a new tuple into T
′
with the same Quasi Identifier attribute values
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Algorithm 1: Data Publishing: Sanitization Algorithm (S)
Input : The Original dataset T (A1,A2, . . . ,An) such that ∣T ∣= m , ∣T ∣ is the number of rows/tuples in T .
Output: The Releasable Data Set T
′
(Ai1 ,Ai2 , . . . ,Aik) where k < n and ∣T
′ ∣= 2m.
1 W.l.o.g Let ,
∙ The set of Explicit Identifiers be EI = {A1, . . . ,Au}
∙ Let QID= {Au+1, . . . ,Av} be the set of Quasi Identifiers;
∙ The set of Sensitive Attributes be SA= {Av+1, . . . ,An}
∙ Let D[Av+1], . . . ,D[An] be the corresponding domain of the attributes in SA.
// The following step removes all the columns corresponding to the Explicit
Identifiers in T which uniquely identify an individual;
2 Remove all the columns A1, . . . ,Au from T . Let the resultant table after elimination be T
′
(Au+1, . . . ,An);
3 for i← v+1 to n do
TSV(Ai) = /0
end
// TSV(Av+1) is the set of Trap Door Attribute Values corresponding to the
sensitive attribute Av+1. For all the sensitive attributes a set is
defined and initially these sets are empty.;
4 foreach t ∈ T ′ do
5 Initialize X = /0 ;
6 foreach Ai ∈ SA do
// The following step chooses the trapdoor attributes values which
are semantically equivalent and with less reputation loss compared to
the attribute value under consideration.;
∙ Select ai ∈ D[Ai]−CAi that satisfies following two conditions
– ai
s⇔ t[Ai] and // t[Ai] is the value of the Ai of tuple in T ′ ;
– RLoss(ai)< RLoss(t[Ai]);
∙ TSV(Ai) = TSV(Ai)∪{ai};
∙ X = X ∪{ai}
end
T
′
= T
′ ∪ {t[Au+1], . . . , t[Av],X};
// The above step adds a new tuple into T ′. The new tuple values are
same values of the QID attributes of t followed by the values in X.
TSV(Ai) is kept secret by data publisher.;
end
// Finally, the T ′ is the dataset to be published that is returned.;
7 Return T
′
.
of the tuple under consideration and the chosen attribute values as the Sensitive Attribute Values. Algorithm 1 gives
the detailed sanitization method of the proposed PPDP to create a releasable dataset from the original dataset. The
data publisher stores the trapdoor attribute values as secret and might delete T . Later, using the secret trapdoor values
and released dataset, data publisher can recover the original dataset.
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Table 1. Original Data Records
No Name Age Sex Zip Nation Condition
1 Ann 28 F 13053 Russian Heart disease
2 Bruce 29 M 13068 Chinese Heart disease
3 Cary 21 F 13068 Japanese Viral infection
4 Dick 23 M 13053 American Viral infection
5 Eshwar 50 M 14853 Indian Cancer
6 Fox 55 M 14750 Japanese Flu
7 Gary 47 M 14562 Chinese Heart disease
8 Helen 49 F 14821 Korean Flu
9 Igor 31 M 13222 American Cancer
Table 2. Released Candidate Records
No Age Sex Zip Nation Condition
1 28 F 13053 Russian Cough
2 28 F 13053 Russian Heart disease
3 29 M 13068 Chinese Heart disease
4 29 M 13068 Chinese Headache
5 21 F 13068 Japanese Viral infection
6 21 F 13068 Japanese Headache
7 23 M 13053 American Cough
8 23 M 13053 American Viral infection
9 50 M 14853 Indian Cancer
10 50 M 14853 Indian Asthma
11 55 M 14750 Japanese flu
12 55 M 14750 Japanese Ovarian cancer
13 47 M 14562 Chinese Asthma
14 47 M 14562 Chinese Heart disease
15 49 F 14821 Korean Ovarian cancer
16 49 F 14821 Korean Flu
17 31 M 13222 American Asthma
18 31 M 13222 American Cancer
3.1. Illustration of the Proposed Scheme with an Example
Suppose Table 1 is the dataset to be published with the attribute Name being the EI, {Age, Gender, Zip Code ,
Nationality} being QID and Condition being the SA. We assume that the domain corresponding Condition is {Heart
disease, Viral infection, Flu, Cancer, Ovarian cancer, Headache, Asthma, Cancer}. The set of values in original
dataset corresponding to Condition is {Heart disease, Viral infection, Flu, Cancer}. Data publisher runs Algorithm
1 on Table 1 to construct the releasable candidate. First the column Name is removed from Table 1. Consider the first
tuple {28, F, 13053, Russian, Heart Disease} without Name value. We assume that cough is semantically equivalent
to the Heart Disease and reputation loss by disclosing cough is less than the reputation loss by disclosing the Heart
disease. By reputation we mean, the damage in society that is caused to an individual due to disclosure of the sensitive
information. We add another tuple {28, F, 13053, Russian, Cough}. Like wise, we carry out for all the tuples in Table
1. As an another instance, consider {21, F, 13068, Japanese, Viral Infection} in Table 1. We assume that Headache
is the semantically equivalent to and has less reputation loss by disclosure compared to Viral Infection. So, {21, F,
13068, Japanese, Headache} is added. The released candidate is generated as shown in Table 2. The set of trapdoor
attribute values of Condition is TSV(Condition)= {Ovarian cancer, Headache, Asthma, Cancer}. The data publisher
keeps secret TSV(Condition) and can recover the original dataset by using TSV(Condition) from the published data.
3.2. Assessing the utility of the published data in proposed Scheme using existing and our own defined metrics
∙ Minimal Distortion Metric: In this metric,a penalty is charged to each instance of a value that is generalized or
suppressed. In the proposed scheme, attribute values are neither generalized nor suppressed. So the penalty is 0.
∙ ILoss DataMetric: This metric captures the information loss of generalizing a specific value to a general value. In
the proposed scheme, we wont generalize any specific value to the general value. So, this metric is not applicable.
∙ Discernibility Metric: This metric is used to define loss metric depending on number of tuples to be sanitized to
generate k anonymous result. In the proposed sanitization method, we wont incur loss as we wont sanitize any
tuple values rather we introduce a new tuple with semantically equivalent sensitive attribute value and with less
reputation by disclosure loss.
∙ Classification Metric: In this metric, a penalty is charged for each record suppressed or generalized to a group in
which the record’s class is not the majority class.The proposed scheme does not use suppression or generalization
the penalty is 0.
∙ Proposed Utility Metric: We assess the usefulness of the data based on the queries that belongs to the set Qs
according to the Definition 2.10. The proposed sanitization mechanism does not add any noise to the original
data records of the individuals. So all the queries that are run on the released candidate dataset with the values
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of the sensitive attributes of the original dataset are preserved. So the utility of the released data is high without
any information loss. The query response for the queries on the released data involving sensitive attributes values
(except trapdoor attribute values) as the condition value in the where clause are preserved. All the queries involving
values of the original table are also preserved.
3.3. Proposed Scheme’s Resistance to Attacks
We provide the details of few of the existing attack models (Fung, Wang, Chen & Yu 2010) and explain how our
proposed scheme withstands/counters the attacks.
∙ Record Linkage Attack: Since our scheme is 2- anonymous the record linkage attack is not possible.
∙ Attribute Linkage Attack or Homogeneity Attack: Here, attacker is assumed to have known some unique char-
acteristics of target individual. In the developed scheme, unique characteristics are not present hence combinatorial
attack is not possible.
∙ Minimality Attack: Depends on adversary’s background knowledge. Adversary cannot separate two domains
as: {Heart Disease, Viral infection, Cancer, Flu} and {Cough, Headache, Asthma, Ovarian cancer} because he
cant get and distinguish the TSA values (secret) from the original SA values. The problem of minimality attack
can be solved by choosing different set of trapdoor attributes for each original attribute. In the above example,
for heart disease = {A1,A2,A3,A4,A5}, Viral infection = {B1,B2,B3,B4,B5} ,Cancer = {C1,C2,C3,C4,C5}, Flu =
{D1,D2,D3,D4,D5} can be chosen as set of corresponding trapdoor attributes such that each of the attribute values
are semantically equivalent to each other within set and also to the original attribute value. As links cannot be
established between attribute sets, attacker cannot find the set of original attributes.
∙ Composition Attack or Multiple Release Attack: In this attack, several data publishers own data sets that are
not disjoint, but they still publish sanitized versions of their data independently of each other. An adversary can
join the multiple released data to get sensitive information. It can be avoided if centralized controller provides
deterministic implementation of the scheme which we are skeptical that it is not practical.
∙ Background Knowledge Attack: It can be avoided by proper selection of trapdoor attribute values.
∙ Proximity Attack: If some sensitive values occur frequently within a sub range of λ (Fung, Wang, Chen &
Yu 2010), then the attacker could still confidently infer the sub range in a group. In the developed scheme guessing
probability is reduced by 50%.
3.4. Proposed Privacy Criterion and Analyzing the scheme for privacy with existing and proposed definitions
∙ (k-Anonymity): To prevent record linkage through QID, if one record in the table has some value qid, at least
k-1 other records also have the value qid. In other words, the minimum group size on QID is at least k. A table
satisfying this requirement is called k-anonymous. In a k- anonymous table, each record is indistinguishable from
at least k-1 other records with respect to QID (Wong & Fu 2010) (Fung, Wang, Fu, & Yu 2010). According to the
definition of k-anonymity, the proposed scheme is 2-anonymous.
∙ (Subset Property). Let QID′ ⊂ QID. If a table T is k- anonymous on QID, then T is also k-anonymous on QID′
(Wong & Fu 2010) (Fung, Wang, Fu, & Yu 2010). In other words, QID
′
is covered by QID, so QID
′
can be
removed from the privacy requirement. In some scenarios, data miner may ask to retain actual values of quasi
identifiers for analysis. So those values can not be generalized and suppressed leading to privacy problems. In the
developed scheme, as we are considering entire set of quasi and non sensitive attributes, all other subsets of QID
can be omitted from privacy requirement. All quasi identifier values are retained for data analysis.
∙ l-diversity: The l-diversity requires every qid group to contain at least l “well-represented” sensitive values (Fung,
Wang, Chen & Yu 2010). The proposed scheme achieves 2 diversity. This prevents the attribute linkage.
Claim 1 (Our Privacy Criterion) Let T (A1, . . . ,An) be the original dataset and T
′
(Ai1 , . . . ,Aik ) such that k < n be
the released candidate data as a result of applying Algorithm 1 to T . W.l.o.g, we consider sensitive attribute set
to be SA = {Aik} and QID = {Ai1 , . . . ,Aik−1}. Let t1 = {ai1 ,ai2 , . . . ,aik} and t2 = {ai1 ,ai2 , . . . ,aik−1 ,bik} be the two
tuples in T
′
such that aik
s⇔ bik and RLoss(bik)< RLoss(aik). Let A be an adversary with the Adversarial Background
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Knowledge α as in Definition 2.9. Then, the probability that A will be able to derive the sensitive information and
disclose identity of the individual is ≤ 1/2.
Proof 1 A with the background knowledge α may try to join an external table X that contains α and the identity of
an individual with the released candidate T
′
. Then for each individual with a given QID values there will be two
records in the join result. So, A has to make choice between two sensitive values to disclose the individual’s sensitive
information. So this probability is ≤ 1/2. Less is because there might be other tuples in T ′ with similar QID values.
It means that there will be more than 2 tuples with similar QID values and with different sensitive attribute values. So
the probability with which an individual’s personal sensitive information is disclosed will be strictly less than 1/2.
4. Conclusion and Future Work
We have designed a new Privacy Preserving Data Publishing using the method of record addition with semantically
equivalent sensitive attribute values and the attribute values with lesser reputation loss by disclosure. We have defined
the privacy criterion and the utility metric and assessed the released data with the existing utility metrics. It is shown
that the proposed sanitization method preserves privacy according to the defined notion and has high utility. The
data publisher will be able to recover the original data from the released data using secret trapdoor sensitive attribute
values. An adversary with the defined background knowledge will not be able to identify and link the sensitive value
to an individual. The proposedmethod preserves privacy and the utility is high compared to the general anonymization
techniques including k-anonymity. As a future work, careful analysis of the original dataset is required to reduce the
number of tuples in the released dataset.
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